The graph here shows a history of failure, particularly recently. The company has lost so much money that’s book equity value per share has plummeted. Revenues have also plummeted. The promise here was that this was R&D biopharma company and that its research efforts would pay off. Instead, nothing has panned out.
Results had turned sharply downwards in 2017 and 2018 after a period of rapidly increasing revenues and especially earnings per share from 2013 to 2016. Revenue per share growth resumed in 2019. Earnings turned sharply higher in 2020, 2021 and 2022 But then revenues and especially earnings per sharp turned very sharply lower in the first nine months of 2023. The company is focused on investing in research and views its existing profitable base business which involves selling certain ingredients to the cosmetics industry as a way to fund its research into what it hopes will be more profitable products. The reason book value increased sharply back in 2016 but that was due to a share issuance at a price well above book value. To date its research has not panned out in anything commercial but it claims to have several promising irons in the fire. Now the company is proposing a merger with another company and this along with the revenue decline has very much clouded the outlook.
| Cosciens Biopharma Inc. (CSCI.TO) | |
| RESEARCH SUMMARY | |
| Report Author(s): | InvestorsFriend Inc. Analyst(s) |
| Author(s)’ disclosure of share ownership: | The Author(s) hold shares |
| Based on financials from: | Dec ’24 Y.E. + Q3 ’25 |
| Last updated: | December 12, 2025 |
| Share Price At Date of Last Update: | $ 2.09 |
| Currency: | $ U.S. for analysis but it trades in $ Canadian |
| Generic Rating (This rating does not consider the circumstances of any individual investor and is therefore not specific advice for any individual): | Highly Speculative Weak Sell at CAN $2.88 or U.S. $2.09 |
| Qualifies as a stock that could be bought with confidence to hold for 20 years? | No, it’s highly speculative |
| Has Wonderful Economics? | No |
| Has Excellent and Trustworthy Management? | Not certain |
| Likely to grow earnings per share at an attractive rate over the next decade? | Not certain |
| Positive near-term earnings outlook? | Unknown |
| Valuation? | Attractive but speculative |
| SUMMARY AND RATING: The graph a lot of volatility – earnings were sometimes negative including recently. The value ratios have deteriorated badly in recent years and would indicate a rating of Sell. Prior management has proven to be inept as virtually none of their many R&D efforts have panned out. The insider trading signal is neutral. Executive compensation now seems reasonable but was formerly excessive. The near term outlook is uncertain. This is a highly speculative Investment. We’ll give new management the benefit of the doubt and rate it a Highly speculative weak sell as opposed to Strong sell. It’s been a disaster. It does appear to have enough cash to struggle on for perhaps another two years waiting for better results. | |
| MACRO ENVIRONMENT: The macro environment such as interest rates and the state of the economy is probably not of much relevance to this company. | |
| LONG TERM VALUE CREATION: There has been huge long-term value destruction based on the share price. | |
| DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS: Cosciens (formerly named Ceapro Inc.) is an Edmonton-based small “biotechnology company”. It has a line of existing cosmetic ingredient products (which it extracts from oats) which are profitable on their own but it formerly believed that its real value and future was in the products and processes it was researching and developing. There were quite a few R&D indicatives but most or possibly all have turned out to be worthless). It currently produces two ingredients for the cosmetics industry on a small commercial scale. It has one other product for a medical diagnosis but which failed tests in the U.S. and may or may not be worth anything although it is still be ing sold in Asia. It has developed (and/or purchased or licenced the rights to) certain proprietary and in some cases patented extraction and production technologies . Some of these are intended to produce commercially valuable methods to “deliver” a variety of drugs and treatments into the human body. They sell mostly (over 90%) through a single distributor and not by direct sales. The current products are used in the cosmetics and include an active ingredient in anti-aging skin creams. Brand names that contain Ceapro’s products include Neutrogena, Lubriderm, Aveeno, Jergens, Dove and others – We suspect its product is in one or a few but certainly not all or most of the products under these brand names. It indicates that it is the sole-source provider of ingredients in a number of products – but the purchasers can drive a hard bargain on price and the quantities needed are not large. | |
| ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS: The economics of its base business appear to be acceptable. But it has basically blown away its profits and most of its equity on various R&D initiatives which have mostly ended up being completely worthless. | |
| RISKS: This is difficult to know given recent major changes at the company. | |
| INSIDER TRADING / INSIDER Holding: There has been no recent insider trades in the public market. Therefore, the insider trading signal is neutral. | |
| WARREN BUFFETT’s CRITERIA: Buffett indicates that all investments must pass four key tests: the business is simple to understand and predict (Fail, because most investors would have no familiarity with the company’s products or its risks), has favorable long-term economics due to cost advantages or superior brand power (marginal pass), apparently able and trustworthy management (too early to tell with new management), a sensible price – below its intrinsic value (hard to say, this is entirely speculative), Other criteria that have been attributed to Buffett include: a low debt ratio (pass there is no debt), good recent profit history (fail) little chance of permanent loss of the investors capital (fail, given the poor track record) a low level of maintenance type capital spending required to maintain existing operations excluding growth (pass) Overall, the company does poorly on these tenets. | |
| MOST RECENT EARNINGS AND SALES TREND: Dismal with significantly lower revenues per share and negative earnings. | |
| COMPARABLE STORE SALES OR INDUSTRY SPECIFIC STATISTICS: Not applicable | |
| Earnings Growth Scenario and Justifiable P/E: With negative profits in the trailing year and plunging revenues earnings provide no guidance to valuation at this time. | |
| VALUE RATIOS: Analysed at a share price of U.S $2.88. As a research oriented company, value ratios provide only limited guidance and in theory understate the value. After several years of GAAP losses, the company was nicely profitable in 2020 and again in 2021 and 2022 but has now reported losses for several years along with plunging revenues. It could be argued that (most of) its research and development expenses are actually creating valuable assets and therefore are more in the nature of investments than expenses – however that research never ever seems to payoff despite many years of promises and more recently they have given up on much of their research efforts. The P/E is now negative as is the ROE! The price to book value ratio is, in isolation, acceptable at 1.80. There is no dividend. Overall the value ratios indicate a highly speculative company that should probably be rated a Strong Sell. | |
| TAXATION FOR SHARE OWNERS: Nothing unusual to note. | |
| SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS | |
| Symbol and Exchange: | CSCI, Toronto covert to U.S |
| Currency: | $ Canadian |
| Contact: | czo@jtcir.com |
| Web-site: | www.ceapro.com |
| INCOME AND PRICE / EARNINGS RATIO ANALYSIS | |
| Latest four quarters annual sales $ millions: | $9.1 |
| Latest four quarters annual earnings $ millions: | $(14.9) |
| P/E ratio based on latest four quarters earnings: | negative |
| Latest four quarters annual earnings, adjusted, $ millions: | $(13.8) |
| BASIS OR SOURCE OF ADJUSTED EARNINGS: Starting 2019 added back 75% of other income or expense which is mostly foreign exchange gains / losses Previously added back 75% (assumes 25% income tax) of plant relocations costs and foreign exchange losses or gains also deducted large periodic tax credits. Deducted a large income tax recovery in 2015. In 2018 adjusted for a gain on litigation settlement and gains on deferred taxes. Starting 2021 we are usually no longer making any adjustments because the earnings are inherently volatile and there is no real value to making adjustments. Unusual legal costs are added back in 2023. These were likely associated with a proposed merger. | |
| Quality of Earnings Measurement and Persistence: Adjusted earnings have been volatile and positive in 2022 but then turned negative in the latest four quarters. Earnings may be under-stated due to the expensing of research and development. Non-refundable government grants are in some ways equivalent to earnings but are mostly accounted for as a reduction of capital costs or a reduction of research expenses. Cash flows in the past exceeded the earnings due the amortization of equipment and leasehold improvements as well as due to deferred income taxes in 2022. | |
| P/E ratio based on latest four quarters earnings, adjusted | negative |
| Latest fiscal year annual earnings: | $(15.3) |
| P/E ratio based on latest fiscal year earnings: | negative |
| Fiscal earnings adjusted: | $(15.3) |
| P/E ratio for fiscal earnings adjusted: | negative |
| Latest four quarters profit as percent of sales | -152.2% |
| Dividend Yield: | 0.0% |
| Price / Sales Ratio | 0.73 |
| BALANCE SHEET ITEMS | |
| Price to (diluted) book value ratio: | 1.31 |
| Balance Sheet: (as of Q3 2025) Assets are composed as follows: 41% is property and equipment (of which 26% is leasehold improvements and 30% is manufacturing equipment, 24% is equipment not yet available for use, and 19% is buildings) ,36% cash, 22% is other current assets (includes inventory, receivables and prepaid expenses). The assets are “financed” as follows:49% by the liability for a an unfunded pension plan that apparently resulted from their 2024 merger transaction), just 21% by equity 17% by current liabilities, and 13% by other liabilities. This is now a relatively weak balance sheet. The balance sheet has weakened considerably in the past few years. | |
| Quality of Net Assets (Book Equity Value): Relatively weak -see comments about the balance sheet composition. | |
| Number of Diluted common shares in millions: | 3.2 |
| Controlling Shareholder: No person or company owns as much as 10% of the shares and therefore the company is likely effectively controlled by management. | |
| Market Equity Capitalization (Value) $ millions: | $6.6 |
| Percentage of assets supported by common equity: (remainder is debt or other liabilities) | 21.3% |
| Interest-bearing debt as a percentage of common equity | 0% |
| Current assets / current liabilities: | 3.5 |
| Liquidity and capital structure: Adequate with no debt. | |
| RETURN ON EQUITY AND ON MARKET VALUE | |
| Latest four quarters adjusted (if applicable) net income return on average equity: | -109.8% |
| Latest fiscal year adjusted (if applicable) net income return on average equity: | -89.5% |
| Adjusted (if applicable) latest four quarters return on market capitalization: | -207.3% |
| GROWTH RATIOS, OUTLOOK and CALCULATED INTRINSIC VALUE PER SHARE | |
| 5 years compounded growth in sales/share | -6.3% |
| Volatility of sales growth per share: | Volatile and recently declining. |
| 5 Years compounded growth in earnings/share | negative past earnings |
| 5 years compounded growth in adjusted earnings per share | n.a. |
| Volatility of earnings growth: | Volatile, and recently negative. |
| Projected current year earnings $millions: | not available |
| Management projected price to earnings ratio: | not available |
| Over the last ten years, has this been a truly excellent company exhibiting strong and steady growth in revenues per share and in (adjusted) earnings per share? | No |
| Expected growth in EPS based on adjusted fiscal Return on equity times percent of earnings retained: | -89.5% |
| More conservative estimate of compounded growth in earnings per share over the forecast period: | 5.0% |
| More optimistic estimate of compounded growth in earnings per share over the forecast period: | 12.0% |
| OUTLOOK AND AMBITIONS FOR BUSINESS: Uncertain. The outlook for the existing base business which has been profitable has recently become quite clouded due to a huge revenue decline in recent years. | |
| LONG TERM PREDICTABILITY: Given the technologies and development risks involved, this is not a predictable company. | |
| Estimated present value per share: As this is an early-stage growth company it does not seem appropriate to attempt to forecast earnings. | |
| ADDITIONAL COMMENTS | |
| INDUSTRY ATTRACTIVENESS: (These comments reflect the industry and the company’s particular incumbent position within that industry segment.) Michael Porter of Harvard argues that an attractive industry is one where firms are somewhat protected from competition based on the following four tests. Barriers to entry (pass due to the science required) No issues with powerful suppliers (pass). No issues with dependence on powerful customers (fail as sales are over 90% to one key wholesaler who then sells to dozens of customers), No potential for substitute products (marginal pass) No tendency to compete ruinously on price (pass). Overall this industry (the base business) appears to be attractive to a successful incumbent in the industry – although the huge reliance on one wholesale customer is a definite concern. | |
| COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: Apparently little or nothing. | |
| COMPETITIVE POSITION: We did not see any information or discussion regarding its competitors or its market share. They have claimed they are the only supplier of some of their products. (Lately with their revenue plunge in the past few years that is coming into question.) | |
| RECENT EVENTS: The company has lost very significant money in the past two years. On December 1, 2025 the company announced an agreement for the commercialization of its Macrilen (macrilen) product in Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore and two provinces of Chine. This product is supposed to be a diagnosis tool for Human growth hormone deficiency but it failed its FDA tests in the U.S. In Q3 2025 the company gave up on its nutraceutical efforts as well as its line of cosmetic. It will focus on its two original products from yeas ago. In 2025 it reduced staff by about 27%. It also put in a new Board. It changed CEOs as Gilles Gagnon finally and left the company which is a very good thing. However a new CEO only lasted a few months. In a VERY big development, the company merged with TSX- and NASDAQ- listed Aeterna Zentaris. Ceapro would become a subsidiary of that company and existing Ceapro shareholders would own 50% of Aeterna. | |
| ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES: Historically, the disclosure was quite poor. In fact the company may have been misleading investors about its prospects for years. (Or perhaps management was simply delusional).It remains to be seen if this improves with the new management. | |
| COMMON SHARE STRUCTURE USED: Normal, one vote per share. | |
| MANAGEMENT QUALITY: With new management, this remains to be seen. Former management appears to have wasted million on research efforts that never panned out. | |
| Capital Allocation Skills: Historically this has been poor under former long-time CEO Gilles Gagnon who apparently wasted millions on numerous research projects that never panned out. | |
| EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: Historically the compensation appeared to be excessive certainly for the CEO. At this time it appears to be more reasonable but, strangely, I could not see a summary compensation table int eh management circular. What I did see is that several executives were compensated in the range of U.S. 250,000. | |
| BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The current Board members may be the lone bright spot for this company. Three members have strong scientific knowledge and drug commercialization experience. Three others have strong investment management experience. Unfortunately, only one director owns shares. That director who recently became interim CEO owns about $750,000 Canadian dollars worth of shares and this MAY be enough to incent him to turn this company around. | |
| Basis and Limitations of Analysis: The following applies to all the companies rated. Conclusions are based largely on achieved earnings, balance sheet strength, achieved earnings per share growth trend and industry attractiveness. We undertake a relatively detailed analysis of the published financial statements including growth per share trends and our general view of the industry attractiveness and the company’s growth prospects. Despite this diligence our analysis is subject to limitations including the following examples. We have not met with management or discussed the long term earnings growth prospects with management. We have not reviewed all press releases. We typically have no special expertise or knowledge of the industry. | |
| DISCLAIMER: All stock ratings presented are “generic” in nature and do not take into account the unique circumstances and risk tolerance and risk capacity of any individual. The information presented is not a recommendation for any individual to buy or sell any security. The authors are not registered investment advisors and the information presented is not to be considered investment advice to any individual. The reader should consult a registered investment advisor or registered dealer prior to making any investment decision. For ease of writing style the newsletter and articles are often written in the first person. But, legally speaking, all information and opinions are provided by InvestorsFriend Inc. and not by the authors as individuals. The author(s) of this report may have a position, as disclosed in each report. The authors’ positions may subsequently change without notice. | |
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