InvestorsFriend Inc. Newsletter
March 2, 2008
Warren Buffett's 2008 Letter
to Shareholders -
Selected Highlights
The book value per share of
Berkshire Hathaway increased 11.0% in 2007. The average compounded increase
since the start of 1965 was 21.1% per year. Remarkably this works out to a
gain of 401,000% in those 43 years. Most investors would agree that such a
record is quite motivating in terms of what can be accomplished through
investing over a lifetime.
"It's a certainty that
insurance-industry profit margins, including ours will fall significantly in
2008."
Buffett discussed the type of business he likes
as follows:
Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn
us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a
business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and
trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag.
We like to buy the whole business or, if
management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality
aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of
great businesses by way of stock market purchases. It’s better to have a part
interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
A truly great business must have an enduring
“moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of
capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business
“castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a
company’s being the low cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful
world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for
sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies
whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out
companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though
capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it
precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will
eventually be no moat at all.
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the
business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a
terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an
abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of
value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their
businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to
produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical
partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and
growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat
will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo
Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.
Long-term competitive advantage in a stable
industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth,
great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will
simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar
businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve
earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses,
earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period
reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.
Derivatives
I was somewhat surprised to
learn in the 2007 letter that Buffett personally manages 62 derivative
contracts. In 2008 he reveals this is now 94 contracts. I was surprised
because Buffett has described derivatives as being very dangerous. Often
they are a bet with some counter-party on the direction that some financial
item will move. For example parties bet which way interest rates or the
stock market or oil prices will move.
This year Buffett provided
details on the derivatives and they look pretty low risk. They all involved
other parties handing Berkshire cash up front and then Berkshire has to pay
out cash if certain events transpire. One group of derivatives provided
Berkshire with cash up front of $4.5 billion and they only have to pay out
if certain stock market indexes are lower at the expiry dates between 2019
and 2027 than those indexes were when the contracts were set. Presumably the
pay-outs at that time could be large. But I suspect the payouts are capped.
I understand Berkshire never takes on any unlimited liability there are
always caps. And the chance of a major stock index being down over such a
long period time is probably remote. Yes, I know that the Japanese index is
still down from its peak way back around 1989 but you can bet that Buffett
has not made this bet based on a stock index that was trading at some bubble
peak. Meanwhile Buffett will invest the $4.5 billion for many years and in
all probability will never have to pay out a dime on these contracts.
The second category of
derivatives that Berkshire has require payouts if certain high-yield bonds
default. Berkshire received $3.2 billion up-front cash and has paid out $472
million to cover defaults. Buffett expects to pay out more but the very
maximum to be paid is another $4.7 billion. Buffet said that a pay-out of
$4.7 billion was extremely unlikely to occur. So, in a worse case Berkshire
might lose on these derivatives. But meanwhile he would have invested the
cash to offset the losses. It sounds like he has taken on bets here that are
likely to be quite profitable.
These derivatives really look
more like insurance than a true derivative. These are far from the dangerous
types of derivatives that many corporations have.
Car Insurance Business
Berkshire owns the car insurance
company GEICO. This company sells direct to individual drivers. They have a
cost advantage because of their size and the fact that they don't have to
pay fees to insurance brokers.
I found it very interesting that
GEICO in November sold its first ever commercial auto policy. GEICO has been
around since the 1930's. Berkshire has controlled the the company for
decades and has owned 100% of it since about 1990.
Most companies are eager to
diversify to grow their business. GEICO must have considered many times
getting into the commercial auto insurance business. And they may have
considered getting into home insurance as well. And yet for all these
decades GEICO stuck to only offering personal auto insurance.
I think this illustrates the
thinking of Buffett and his discipline. GEICO had a competitive advantage in
personal auto insurance. For whatever reasons Buffett must have judged that
commercial auto was not as attractive and the company had the discipline to
decline to enter that market. Until now, when presumably they have judged
the time to be right for this move.
U.S. trade deficit and the
U.S. dollar.
Buffett views the current trade
imbalances as unsustainable and appears to believe that the U.S. dollar will
continue to fall. But he has no active direct currency bets at this time
accept a bet that the Brazilian Real will rise. He also notes that
Berkshire's investments in foreign companies and bonds will benefit from a
falling dollar. (So these might be considered as an implicit bet against the
U.S. dollar).
Long-term future stock market
returns
Buffett indicates that the DOW
in the 20th century rose an average compounded 5.3% per year (dividends
provided substantial additional returns). He appears to indicate than
an expectation of an average of 5.3% rise in market indexes this century is
quite optimistic. This would require the DOW to rise to 2 million by
the year 2100 which he implies is optimistic. He also notes that with
dividend yield around 2%, an expectation for 10% annual returns (which many
people do expect) requires 8% annual gains in the market indexes which would
require the DOW to be at 24 million by the year 2100 which he seems to
indicate is impossible.
More Information
For additional information on
how Warren Buffett picks stocks and for a link to where you can read his
letters, see our article.
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END
Shawn Allen, President
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